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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This study evaluates the process of ‘nesting’ in redistricting on various redistricting 
criteria, including compactness, minimizing city and county divisions and the creation of 
majority minority seats.  Nesting is performed in two different ways, first by adding two 
Assembly districts to make up one Senate district, and second by dividing Senate districts 
into two Assembly districts.   
 
The results show that nested districts, no matter whether they are constructed through 
aggregation or division, impede the creation of majority minority districts and lead to 
more city and county splits than non-nested districts do.  Nesting by dividing Senate 
Districts into Assembly seats is a slightly better method based on these criteria.   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The State of California has seen much interest in redistricting reform during the 
past four years.  In the 2005 special election, Proposition 77, a measure that would have 
taken the process away from the legislature and given it to a commission, was defeated.  
After its defeat, activist groups interested in reform, including those that had opposed 
Prop. 77 for various reasons, formed a coalition to draft a better proposal, in hopes to 
convince the legislature to consider redistricting reform, or alternatively attempt to place 
a new measure on the ballot in the 2008 primary.  By the spring of 2007, the legislature 
had revived a number of redistricting bills in both houses, and two measures were being 
circulated for signatures by activist groups.   
 
 At least two of the recent redistricting reform proposals include the requirement 
for nested districts.  The term nesting refers to the incorporation of two Assembly 
districts within the boundaries of a single Senate district.  There are two ways to nest.  
One can draw the smaller units first, and then combine them into the larger unit, which is 
how nesting has been done previously in California, or one can go the other way, drawing 
the Senate district first and then dividing it into two Assembly districts.  This study 
considers the implications of both. Either way, the effect is to create a match between two 
Assembly districts and one Senate seat.   
 
The fact that California has exactly half as many State Senate seats as Assembly 
seats (i.e. 40 and 80 respectively) makes nesting a feasible option. California has had two 
decades of experience with nesting after the 1973 and 1991 redistricting plans were 
drawn, and two decades of experience with non-nested districts in 1981 and 2001. Simply 
stated, when the legislature has controlled the line-drawing process, it has opted against 
nesting.  When the courts have done the redistricting, they have nested. Which way is 
best? 
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NESTING PROS AND CONS 
 
 
Pros 
 
 There are several arguments for nesting, but as in many situations in which a 
highly complex topic is debated, there are different ways of looking at the same coin. 
 
First, nesting is very convenient for those who actually have to draw the lines 
since it reduces the total amount of line-drawing by half.  By simply dividing the Senate 
districts or combining the Assembly seats, a line-drawer can in essence fashion the 
second house from the first.  Given the complexity of redistricting and the amount of time 
it takes to construct a valid, legal plan for the State of California, this can certainly be an 
attractive option.   
 
Second, nesting plausibly hampers efforts to individualize district lines for 
incumbent or party purposes, much as other “formal” criteria do (i.e. criteria that concern 
the form of a district such as compactness, contiguity, etc).  Requiring nesting, in 
essence, is a “handcuffing” approach that assumes that the more constrained the process, 
the more likely the outcome will be neutral.  But of course, “handcuffing” or constraining 
line drawers with formal requirements like nesting will also constrain the achievement of 
good or desirable goals along with the more controversial ones.   
 
Third, some nesting proponents argue that it encourages more cooperation at the 
legislative level.  Pairing Assembly legislators with Senators in common district space 
might in theory encourage the three grouped legislators to work together more 
cooperatively in order to protect or further the interests of the area they jointly represent.  
But it is also possible that the pairing arrangement creates incentives to compete, since 
both Assembly members might think that they are the logical heir to the corresponding 
Senate district. 
 
Finally, there is a strictly administrative proponent view from the local registrars 
of voters and county clerks who are charged with the administration of elections.  These 
local election administrators prefer nested districts because it reduces the number of 
ballot groups and precincts by approximately 10 to 15% in counties with over 100,000 
voters that have at least one or more Senate Districts within its boundaries, and possibly 
more in larger counties with multiple languages.  Nesting, to the registrars of the larger 
counties, is a time and money saving criterion.  But many say that in light of the 1200 
odd special districts in California, there are so many lines that criss-cross the various 
existing political boundaries that one more set of lines is not too much of a burden for 
registrars, especially since only some counties would be affected at all.  Smaller counties 
that are completely contained within one Senate District would not be affected by nesting 
either way. 
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Cons 
 
There are also many arguments against nesting, and again, as above, what may 
look like a negative to some is a positive to others. 
 
Among the arguments against nesting are: one, that adding any additional 
criterion to the already long list of redistricting criteria that must be followed (including 
equal population, the Voting Rights Act, contiguity, respect for city and county 
boundaries, compactness and so on) makes the line drawing process even more 
constrained.  In turn, this makes it more difficult to meet more subjective criteria that 
may be raised by certain communities.  This of course also goes to the ‘hand-cuffing’ 
argument that some in the pro-nesting camp feel is necessary to curb political mischief. 
 
Two, nesting may double a wrong in cases in which an Assembly district does not 
meet the need of certain groups.  For example, the same Assembly lines that divide a 
neighborhood or split a city will be used to construct the Senate seat because nesting is 
required.  The neighborhood or the city would thus face the same hardship in each house, 
lower and upper, and not have an opportunity to fight for different boundaries with the 
other plan.   
 
Three, nesting is said to be harmful to party cohesion.  California’s political 
geography is such that registration majorities for the major parties are regionally aligned.  
For example, the coast is largely democratic while the central valley is largely republican.  
Consequently, nesting will in many cases produce two Assembly districts, held by 
members of the same party, which are nested in the same Senate District.   Because 
California is a state with term limits, Assembly members are often looking to the Senate 
district as a logical step up in their political career.  Nested districts, as a result, may 
produce two members of the same party vying for the same seat, asking for support from 
the same colleagues and competing for campaign contributions.  Party unity can certainly 
be undermined in this scenario. 
 
 
 
STUDYING NESTING 
 
The purpose of this study is to test the effects of nesting by using a variant of the 
experimental design we used previously in our competitiveness report1.  In the sections of 
the report that follows, we will first describe the method we used to test for nesting 
effects.  Second, we will describe our experimental results.  Third, we will discuss the 
results of interviews with former members who held nested seats in the nineties.  And 
finally, we will make some concluding observations about nesting practices. 
 
                                                 
1 Competition and Redistricting in California: Lessons for Reform by Bruce E. Cain, Karin Mac Donald 
and Iris Hui.  Data, maps and the first two reports on Competition and on Transparency are available at:   
http://swdb.berkeley.edu/redistricting_research/ 
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The results can be summarized as follows. While nesting may make it more 
difficult for line-drawers to achieve a partisan advantage and to protect incumbents, the 
process also results in a more limited ability to observe county and city boundaries, and 
to create majority minority seats.  Interviews with legislators reveal that the prospect of 
running for a higher seat in a nested arrangement definitely affects their thinking and 
dealings with the other Assembly member.  Sometimes, legislators work this conflict out 
informally, but sometimes not. 
 
 
Method 
 
 In the first redistricting report in this research series we developed an 
experimental design to test the potential for drawing more competitive Congressional and 
Assembly seats.  The basic design was to generate multiple plans using different line-
drawers with set objectives (e.g. purely formal boxes, maximizing the number of 
competitive seat, fully constrained plans, etc), and then measure the average affects 
across each sub-set of plans.   
 
 In this report, we essentially extended the same methodology as in our 
competition study to cover a new question: namely, what are the effects of drawing 
nested Assembly seats as compared to non-nested?  Since there are two types of nesting, 
we divided our experiment into two halves: in the first, we first drew Assembly districts 
and then combined them to form Senate seats; and in the second, we first constructed 
whole Senate seats and then divided them to create two nested Assembly districts. For the 
purposes of discussion, we will call the first method “aggregation” and the second 
“division.” 
 
Five mappers, four of which had never drawn redistricting plans, were given the task of 
creating maps that followed the equal population and contiguity requirements. Mappers 
were instructed to draw districts as compact as possible. Only census demographic data 
was used in the creation of the maps, but political data was used later in the analysis.  The 
starting point for the plans was rotated from the upper left corner to the upper right, the 
lower left and the lower right.  First, mappers drew ‘random box plans’ that ignored all 
other criteria.  These plans consisted of contiguous equal population districts.  These 
plans are the closest scenario to using a computer program to automatically draw 
districts. Voting Rights Act (VRA) considerations, as well as city and county boundaries 
were ignored.  
The mapping criteria then focused on two major redistricting principles: 1) fulfilling the 
VRA requirement and drawing majority-minority districts where possible and 2) 
preserving political subdivisions by minimizing county and city splits.  Finally, ‘balanced 
plans’ were developed that took all criteria into consideration.  Balanced plans come 
closest to what an actual and ‘legal’ redistricting map would look like.    
 
For each scenario, mappers developed multiple upper and lower house plans, keeping in 
perspective that the resulting districts would be either nested (i.e. Assembly Districts 
would be aggregated to make up Senate Districts) or split (i.e. Senate Districts would be 
divided into two Assembly Districts).  After aggregation or division of the districts, 
depending on the level of district on the base map, the plans were evaluated on their 
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effect on majority minority districts drawn, cities and counties kept in-tact, compactness 
and finally on how many potentially competitive districts had been created.   
 
Again, as we point out in our first report, only what we call the “balanced plan” actually 
simulates what a court, legislature or other redistricting body such as a commission, 
would likely draw.  Please note that we could not simulate ‘communities of interest’ as 
those are mainly defined during public testimony in redistricting hearings, and through 
submissions to the redistricting body.  We also did not perform polarized voting analysis 
as this was outside of the scope of possibility for this project.   
 
The purpose of the other three types of plans is to test the limit that nesting has on any 
particular goal.  The so-called box plan allows us to see the consequences of nesting on a 
purely mechanical redistricting that draws square, equi-populous boxes and nothing else. 
The max-minority lines simulate the pure maximization of equi-populous, majority 
minority districts. And the minimizing city and county jurisdiction lines plans protect 
jurisdictional lines to the greatest extent possible.  However, we must emphasize again 
that only the balanced plans that take into account all these factors come close to passing 
legal and political scrutiny.   
 
The following maps illustrate the two nesting methods: 
 
The maps in figures 1a and 1b illustrate nesting by the method of aggregating two 
Assembly Districts into Senate seats.  Specifically these maps illustrate the aggregation 
of the (hypothetical) 22nd and 23rd Assembly Districts in figure 1a into the 14th Senate 
district in figure 1b. 
           
Figure 1a: 
 
Figure 1b: 
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The maps in figures 2a and 2billustrate the nesting method of dividing Senate seats into 
two Assembly districts.  Specifically, these maps illustrate the division of the 
hypothetical 13th Senate District in figure 1a into Assembly Districts 13 and 13B in figure 
1b. 
   
Figure 2a: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2b: 
 For both methods, we constructed four plan types: compact squares, i.e. “Box 
plans”, plans that minimize city and county boundary splits, plans that maximize 
majority-minority seats and plans that combine the latter two goals.  All plan types 
observed the equal population criterion and contiguity.  As a comparison, for each one of 
the treatments, we drew between 3 and 6 plans.   
 
 We compared the effects of nested and non-nested plans as follows.  First, we 
computed the average number of various plan attributes for each sub-type.  For example, 
we computed the average number of Latino seats (i.e. over 50% Latino population), the 
number of coalition seats (i.e. Black and Latino populations over 50%), the number of 
Black seats (i.e. 30% and up), the average number of county splits, the average of 
counties that were split more than once, etc.  We then subtracted the nested numbers from 
the un-nested ones to get measures of relative effects.   
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 Thus, the first entry in Table 1a (please see Appendix 1) is for the “aggregated” 
plans (i.e. combining two Assembly districts into a Senate seat) with formal square 
districts of equal population and no other constraints.  The entry .67 indicates that the un-
nested Senate seats yielded .67 more Latino seats (i.e. with Latino populations greater 
than or equal to 50%) than the “aggregated” nested seats.  In the aggregated plans that 
minimized city and county splits, the un-nested seats averaged .60 more Latino seats than 
the aggregated nested ones.  In the plans that maximized majority minority seats, the 
difference shoots up to 3.8 and in the fully constrained, it is 1.57.  The negative entries in 
the table indicate where the aggregated nested seats produced more of a given feature on 
average than the un-nested.  So for example, in the square box plans, the un-nested plans 
produced -.33 fewer Black districts (Black populations greater than 30%) than the 
aggregated nested plans did. 
                
 
Results 
 
 Overall, the effects seem clearest for Latino seats and city/county splits. The 
results were mixed in most other instances. Below, we summarize by the attributes: 
majority minority seats created, city (i.e. census place) and county splits, and 
compactness.  We also report the effect of nesting on potential competitiveness. 
 
 
1. Majority Minority Seats 
 
There is some evidence from our exercise that nesting, especially “aggregation,” will 
constrain the ability to draw more majority Latino seats.  This makes sense as 
California’s Latino population is more dispersed and less clustered into compact areas 
than the State’s African-American population.  Hence, attempts to preserve Latino 
concentrations will run afoul of formal constraints like compactness and nesting. 
 
In the “aggregated” nesting experiments, where we constructed two Assembly seats and 
combined them into Senate districts, the non-nested seats produced more majority Latino 
seats than the nested in all four types of plans (please see table 1a. in Appendix 1).  The 
effects were most dramatic in the maximization of majority minority seats and the 
balanced plans (3.8 and 1.57 seats respectively), and less in the pure box plans (.67) and 
the minimize city/county splits plans (.60).  The effects were also clear in the potential 
for combined Black and Latino majority minority seats.  In all cases, the non-nested seats 
do better than aggregated “nested” ones.  The numbers were .50 for the box plans, .60 for 
the plans that minimize jurisdictional splits, 1.80 for the maximize majority minority 
plans, and 2.07 for the balanced plans.  However the effect is opposite for the number of 
Black influence seats: in three out of four instances the “aggregated” nested plans do 
better than the non-nested.  However, the one instance where the nested did worse than 
the non-nested were the plans that balanced the criteria: i.e. in the plans most like what 
would actually be drawn. The differences were respectively -.33 for the box plans, -.8 for 
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minimize jurisdictional split plans, -.4 for the coalitional districts and .57 for the balanced 
plans.  The negative signs indicate that the nested plans did better than the non-nested. 
 
The results in the “division” nested experiments were more mixed, which may suggest a 
somewhat lower level of constraint.  The nested plans actually did better for Latino and 
coalition districts in two out of four types of plans; (see table 2a, in Appendix 2).  For 
Latino majority districts, the nested seats did better in plans that minimize jurisdictional 
splits (-.40) and those that maximize majority-minority seats (-5.33), but worse than the 
non-nested plans in the box (1.0) and balanced plans (1.00).  For the coalitional districts, 
the nested plans did better in the box (-.17) and maximize coalitional seats (-4.83) 
scenarios, but worse than the non-nested plans in the maps that minimize jurisdictional 
splits (.67) and the balanced plans (1.17).  In all cases, there were more Black influence 
seats in the non-nested than nested seats. 
 
The balanced plans that are closest to what a legislature would actually produce, and in 
ALL instances, the non-nested balanced plans do better than both the aggregated and 
division nested plans. Given the observations of our line-drawing team and the somewhat 
greater inconsistency of the numbers across in the division nested scenarios, it is possible 
that the division method for nesting is less constraining for line drawers with respect to 
minority representation.  The following maps illustrate the difficulty in creating nested 
districts when aggregating Assembly seats to create a Senate seat. 
   
 
Figure 3a:  Assembly District Base Map 
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igure 3b: Senate districts aggregated from the Assembly district base map in figure F
3a. 
 
 
 
he maps in figures 3a and 3b (above) illustrate the potential constraint that Assembly 
y 
rity 
T
district base maps pose on the creation of majority-minority Senate seats when nesting b
aggregation.  Please note the geographically isolated, individual majority-minority 
Assembly districts and their lack of geographic contiguity with other majority-mino
Assembly seats in figure 3a. This lack of geographical contiguity between majority-
minority Assembly seats in the base map is what constrains the creation of majority-
minority Senate districts in this example when nesting by aggregation
 
This effect can be seen in the second map in figure 3b.where the lack of a neighboring 
majority minority Assembly district with which to aggregate another geographically 
isolated majority-minority Assembly district resulted in Senate districts that were also not 
majority minority.   
 
2. Splits of Counties and Census Places 
 
The next question is whether nested seats cause more or fewer splits of local 
jurisdictional lines. The answer for the aggregated nested seats is preponderantly that the 
non-nested perform better again than the nested. The figures represent the difference in 
the number of splits produced on average by the non-nested versus the nested. Positive 
numbers mean that the non-nested plans produced more splits and negative numbers 
means the nested plans on average produced more splits (see Table 1b in Appendix 1).   
 
Figure 4a: Assembly District Base Map 
 
 
 
Figure 4a above shows in green the census places in Los Angeles County that were split 
in an Assembly district base map.  Please note that the Assembly base map in figure 4a 
splits 10 census places within Los Angeles County. The maps below in figures 4b and 4c 
illustrate two different aggregated Senate district plans that were created from the base 
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map in figure 4a and the resulting census place splits.  The beige areas represent census 
places that were re-united or “unsplit” during the aggregation of the Senate districts while 
the green areas represent census places that were still split after the aggregation of the 
Assembly districts to the Senate districts.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4b: Senate Districts aggregated from the Assembly District base map in figure 
4a. 
 
 
 
Please note in figure 4b that after the aggregation of the Assembly districts into Senate 
seats six census places were re-united, represented by the beige areas, while 4 census 
places remain split, as indicated by the green areas.  This does not include the city of Los 
Angeles which must always be split because of the size of its population. 
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Figure 4c: An alternate Senate District plan aggregated from the Assembly District base 
map in figure 4a. 
 
 
 
Please note in figure 4c. that after the aggregation of the Assembly districts into an 
alternate Senate plan, only five census places were re-united while 5 census places 
remain split.  Now compare this to the maps of the un-nested Senate district plans in 
figures 4d and 4e.   
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Figure 4d. “Un-nested” Senate Districts – split of only one census place 
 
 
 
 
The first example of an un-nested Senate district plan in figure 4d splits only one census 
place, Long Beach while the second example of an un-nested Senate district contained in 
figure 4e, below, splits the same census place, Long Beach, in a different location.  
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Figure 4e: “Un-nested” Senate Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of the pure random box plans, the non-nested plans produced more county 
(3.67) and census place (9.67) splits, and split more counties (1.00) and census places 
(8.33) split into two or more pieces; i.e. compound splits.   But when we explicitly tried 
to reduce the number of county and census splits, the so-called “minimizing split plans,” 
the nested plans did worse, with higher numbers of county (-4.67) and census place splits 
(-14.2).  This pattern was also evident in the “maximize majority minority” district plans 
(-1.00, -16.60) and the balanced plans (-3.63, -2.17). The same pattern held for compound 
county and census place splits. On balance, then, the non-nested plans did better than the 
aggregated nested plans in minimizing splits. 
 
The “division” nesting also proved to be somewhat worse than the non-nested plans in 
minimizing splits, but as with the minority seats, the division method does better; (please 
see table 2b, in Appendix 2).  The box plans yielded more nested county and census place 
splits (-4.67.-12.17) and more compound splits (-2.33,-7.50). Similarly, the nested had 
more county and census place splits (-2.50, -27.00) and compound splits (-.67, -1.33) in 
the maximize minority scenarios.   
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In the other two scenarios, the results were mixed.  In the plans that minimized 
jurisdictional splits, the nested districts did worse (-.33) in terms of county and better in 
terms of census place splits (15.17).  The opposite was true for the balanced plans: the 
nested plans did better in the county (1.75) and worse in the census place splits (-8.50).  
Since we give the greatest weight to the balanced plans because they are the only plans 
we developed that are somewhat realistic, this is further evidence that the division 
method is superior to aggregation nesting. 
 
 
3. Potential Competitiveness 
 
While this was not a major focus, we did evaluate the created plans under various 
scenarios in terms of number of potentially competitive seats in nested versus non-nested 
plans.  Because evaluating plans for potential competitiveness was not one of the goals of 
this project, we only used one measure for this analysis, i.e. party registration difference 
within 7 points.  Please refer to our report on competitiveness and redistricting for an 
elaboration on the different measures and data that can be, and are, used to evaluate 
districts for this criterion, and a discussion of factors that affect whether even a 
competitive district in fact produces competitive electoral contests.   
 
Positive numbers mean the nested plans produced more competitive seats and negative 
numbers indicate that the non-nested did. There was no difference in the aggregated box 
plans between nested and non-nested, but in the other three scenarios, including the 
balanced plan, the nested did worse than the non-nested in the number of competitive 
seats (-.70, -3.80,-1.90); (see Table 1c in Appendix 1).  
 
The division nesting method does marginally better compared to not nesting at all in 
producing more competitive seats when creating box plans, minimizing jurisdictional 
splits, and maximizing majority minority plans (-2.83, -.27, -1.00), but the nested plans 
did worse than the non-nested in the most important, and the only remotely legal, 
category of the balanced plans (1.83); (see Table 2c in Appendix 2).  This might be taken 
as an exception to our preference for division over aggregation nesting, but it is important 
to note that we were not intentionally trying to draw competitive seats.  This was simply 
a side effect of plans intended for other purposes. 
 
 
4. Compactness 
 
As with competitiveness, we did not make compactness a primary goal.  There is no 
consensus on the best compactness measure, so we used several different ones that are 
commonly reported in redistricting software.  Higher scores in all but the perimeter test 
indicate more compact districts (see Tables 1d and 1e in Appendix 1).  As one might 
expect, the box plans received the best scores; and almost all of our plans beat the status 
quo districts by most measures. But is there a difference between non-nested, aggregated 
nested and division nested? 
 
 17
For the purposes of simplicity, we focused on the differences between the nested and 
non-nested mean scores of the balanced plans across the various compactness measures.  
For the aggregated nested versus non-nested comparison, four of the six measures of the 
difference in mean compactness for the balanced (i.e. realistic) plan slightly favor the 
non-nested over the nested. But for the division nested plans, four of the differences in 
the nested plans indicate a more compact level than the non-nested lines (see Tables 2d 
and 2e in Appendix 2).  We take this to be yet another indication that the division method 
appears to be superior to the aggregated nested method. 
 
 
 
NESTING AND MEMBER COOPERATION 
 
There are other considerations that should be taken into account when nesting as a 
criterion is contemplated. 
 
Aside from the effects that nesting has on line-drawing per se, what effects does nesting 
have on legislative behavior?  To answer this question, we devised a questionnaire and 
interviewed former members of the Assembly.  We asked seven questions: 
 
1. Did the nesting arrangement facilitate or undermine relationship with the member 
of the other nested Assembly district in your Senate seat? 
 
2. Did the relationship with the other nested seat change over time as the prospect of 
the senate seat opening became more imminent? 
 
3. What are some examples of successful cooperation on legislation with the other 
nested seat member? 
 
4. What are some examples of unsuccessful efforts at cooperation on legislation with 
the other nested seat member? 
 
5. Did you mail into the other district?  If so, when and about what? 
 
6. Did you do appearances in the other districts?  If so, what sort? 
 
7. Do you favor making nesting a requirement for future redistricting? Why/why 
not? 
 
The responses we received were from five Democrats and three Republicans. Three of 
them had been paired with members of the other party; and their answers reflect the fact 
that partisan concerns are more of an obstacle in that type of situation. In the nineties, as 
Appendix 3 indicates, the number of same party pairs ranged from a high of 32 in 1994 to 
a low of 27 in 1996, and the number of pairs from different parties ranged from 12 in 
1996 to 8 in 1994.  In short, the question of cooperation will likely arise mostly in the 
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context of same party pairings unless the landscape of California changes drastically in 
the future. 
 
Another issue of note is that in the end, most members did not run against each other for 
the Senate seat. Usually, this matter was worked out informally, avoiding expensive 
battles between two lower house incumbents.  Table 3 shows the three elections that 
pitted two former Assembly incumbents against one another in the nineties.  
 
Table 3: 
 
Year SD AD Assembly Member Party 
2000 21 43 Scott Wildman D 
  44 Jack Scott D 
     
 23 41 Sheila James Kuehl D 
  42 Wally Knox D 
     
     
1998 10 18 Michael Sweeney D 
  20 Liz Figueroa D 
     
1996 7 11 Bob Campbell D 
  15 Richard K. Rainey R 
 
 
In all but one instance, these involved primary battles between two members of the same 
party.  Given that the Senate is represented by former Assembly members, it is somewhat 
surprising that more members did not compete against each other in their party primaries. 
But several factors explain this.  First, members are usually in different cycles of their 
terms, and the member who is later in the cycle has more of an incentive to run than the 
one who was more recently elected.  Second, informal discussion and agreements often 
serve to persuade one member to back down when two are eyeing the same seat. 
 
But even if two member primaries are relatively rare, it is possible that the prospect of 
running against the other member might cause some tensions.  Hence our first questions 
asked whether the nesting facilitated or undermined cooperation. The responses were 
varied: two indicated that it undermined relationships, three that it facilitated cooperation, 
and three others had qualified responses.  It is interesting that two of the three who 
thought that it facilitated cooperation were in pairings of opposite political ideologies.  
Since party ties usually divide these members, the fact that they had common local 
projects sometimes brought them together.   
 
Several indicated that it depended upon the specific ambitions and personalities of the 
members.  If both members were ambitious and headed for the Senate seat, this would 
weaken cooperation.  The best situation was one in which there was a clear understanding 
of who would run for the Senate seat when it opened.  But clearly, there are two 
incentives at work. Sometimes the fact that they represent the same county or parts of the 
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same city means that they would work together for some common goal.  But it could also 
mean that there could be a competition for credit when there was potential electoral 
benefit. 
 
We then asked whether relationships changed as the prospect of a Senate opening 
approached, and in all but two instances, the respondents thought that was a possibility. 
One former member analogized it to two people sharing a house knowing that at the end 
of the year, one would have to leave: “imagine how people would feel about living 
together…things start to happen in the middle of the night.”  When cooperation was 
achieved, it tended to be local in nature:  helping a hospital become a “specialty” facility, 
dealing with a local firm that had mishandled the cremation of deceased constituents, 
building a new high school, etc. Examples of when cooperation broke down tended to 
center around competition for claiming exclusive or disproportionate credit on projects 
that both members had worked on. 
 
It is clear that members who are thinking of running for the larger Senate seat lay the 
groundwork by mailing and appearing in nearby areas outside their Assembly district. 
But several pointed out that it was not legal to use the publicly funded mailings for this 
purpose, and that they only mailed with campaign funds.  Visits, however, seem to be 
another matter.  All of them made appearances in the other nested district. 
 
On the all important question of whether they favor nesting as a policy or not, we again 
had a wide dispersion:  three in favor, four against, and one indifferent.  One of them 
mentioned it as a way to restrict “gerrymandering.” Two thought it made the lines of 
accountability clearer.   
 
Please see the summary chart in Appendix 4 for responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to test some of the common assertions that are made about 
nesting districts. There are several observations that follow from the research discussed in 
this report.  First, the strongest argument for nesting is convenience.  When pressed to 
draw lines in a short period of time, a position the courts have found themselves in twice 
in California history, it is simpler to draw one set of lines and combine or divide them 
than to draw two separate plans.  But for line drawers that have more time, the 
advantages of drawing one set of lines have to be offset against the constraints and 
limitations that nesting brings. Nesting is also marginally more convenient for Registrars 
of Voters and other election officials; but it results in only a ballot type reduction on the 
order of 10-15% since there are so many special district jurisdictions that complicate the 
 20
California ballot.  This reduction, furthermore, is only realized in some counties and not 
all.   
 
Second, it is quite possible that nesting will cause more city and county splits, and limit 
the ability to give fair representation to the Latino community in particular.  This is 
especially true of aggregation as opposed to division nesting. This is not a surprising 
result in the sense that the more formal constraints that line drawers have to work with, 
the more likely that the various criteria will conflict with one another, and limit the ability 
to achieve substantive goals, including ones that relate to federal law. 
 
Third, while there was some disagreement about the exact effects that nesting has on 
member cooperation, a number of the former members we interviewed indicated that 
there was sometimes tension between Assembly members eyeing the same Senate seat.  
In most cases, this seems to get resolved with informal understandings and agreements, 
but it seems to contribute to more intra-party tension.   
 
Given that there might be situations when the courts or the legislature must draw lines 
under a tight deadline, nesting might be an option for the state’s line-drawers.  However, 
if nesting is to be used, we would recommend the division method, not aggregation. At 
the same time, there does not seem to be a case for requiring nesting.  Our research shows 
that it can hinder the creation of minority districts and it leads to a greater number of 
local jurisdictional splits.   
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APPENDIX 1:  Tables of differences between the non-nested Senate plan averages and the 
"aggregated" Senate plan averages   
  
  
Table 1a: Majority-Minority Seats         
Plan type Majority-minority seats       
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat 
No. of 
Latino 
seat 
(50%+) 
No. of 
Black 
seat 
(30%+) 
Potential 
Minority 
Coalition 
No. of 
Latino + 
Black add 
up to 50%+ 
      
No treatment plans   0.67 -0.33 0.50       
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  0.60 -0.80 0.60       
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X 3.80 -0.40 1.80       
Respect CC & Max. MM 
plans X X 1.57 0.57 2.07       
            
Table 1b: City and County Splits         
Plan type County Splits out 58 City Splits out of 1,081      
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat 
No. of 
County 
Split 
No. of 
County 
split in 
two 
No. of 
Census 
places split 
No. of 
Census 
places 
split in 
two 
     
No treatment plans   3.67 1.00 9.67 8.33      
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -4.67 -1.63 -14.20 -10.60      
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X -1.00 -0.20 -16.60 -22.40      
Respect CC & Max. MM 
plans X X -3.63 -2.17 -0.50 0.97      
            
Table 1c: Competitive Seats         
Plan type 
       
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat 
2000 Party 
Registration No. of 
competitive seat    
(7 pt) 
       
No treatment plans   0.00        
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans 
X  -0.70 
       
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans 
 X -3.80 
       
Respect CC & Max. MM 
plans X X -1.90        
            
Table 1d: Compactness Scores        
Plan type Roeck: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact Schwartzberg: Greater or equal to 1, 1 most compact 
Perimeter: 
Smaller total 
perimeter=most 
compact, 
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev Sum 
No treatment plans   -0.01 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.00 0.00 329.21 
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans 
X  0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.48 0.10 0.09 992.57 
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans 
 X -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.21 1.26 0.38 0.22 2,859.70 
Respect CC & Max. MM 
plans 
X X 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.03 1,328.65 
                    
Table 1e: Compactness Scores (continued)        
Plan type Polsby-Popper:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact 
Population Polygon:  Between 0 and 
1, 1 most compact 
 
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev 
 
No treatment plans   0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.05 -0.04  
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.02  
Respect CC & Max. MM 
plans X X -0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00  
            
Table 1f: Compactness Scores (continued)        
Plan type Population Circle:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact 
Ehrenburg:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most 
compact 
 
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev 
 
No treatment plans   0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.02  
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00  
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.00  
Respect CC & Max. MM 
plans X X 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02  
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APPENDIX 2:  Tables of differences between the non-nested Assembly plan averages and the  
"divided" Assembly plan averages   
  
  
Table 2a: Majority-Minority Seats          
Plan type Majority-minority seats        
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat 
No. of 
Latino 
seat 
(50%+) 
No. of 
Black 
seat 
(30%+) 
Potential 
Minority 
Coalition 
No. of 
Latino + 
Black add 
up to 
50%+ 
       
No treatment plans   1.00 0.33 -0.17        
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -0.40 0.87 0.67        
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X -5.33 2.33 -4.83        
Respect CC & Max. 
MM plans X X 1.00 0.58 1.17        
            
Table 2b: City and County Splits         
Plan type County Splits out 58 City Splits out of 1,081 
     
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat 
No. of 
County 
Split 
No. of 
County 
split in 
two 
No. of 
Census 
places 
split 
No. of 
Census 
places split 
in two 
     
No treatment plans   -4.67 -2.33 -12.17 -7.50      
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -0.33 -3.67 15.17 14.42      
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X -2.50 -0.67 -27.00 -1.33      
Respect CC & Max. 
MM plans X X 1.75 0.83 -8.50 -6.58      
            
Table 2c: Competitive Seats          
Plan type        
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat 
2000 Party 
Registration No. of 
competitive seat (7 pt) 
       
No treatment plans   -2.83        
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -0.27        
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X -1.00        
Respect CC & Max. 
MM plans X X 1.83        
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Table 2d: Compactness Scores         
Plan type Roeck: Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact Schwartzberg: Greater or equal to 1, 1 most compact 
Perimeter: 
Smaller total 
perimeter=most 
compact, 
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev Sum 
No treatment plans   0.16 0.26 0.20 0.01 0.08 -0.12 -0.02 -0.02 -289.59 
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.21 -0.21 -0.06 -0.02 -902.34 
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.01 -0.22 -3.26 -0.55 -0.40 -3,945.65 
Respect CC & Max. 
MM plans X X -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.72 -0.24 -0.14 -2,664.11 
                       
Table 2e: Compactness Scores (continued)        
Plan type Polsby-Popper:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact Population Polygon:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact 
 
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev 
 
No treatment plans   0.02 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.01 -0.01  
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01  
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.02  
Respect CC & Max. 
MM plans X X 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.01  
            
Table 2f: Compactness Scores (continued)        
Plan type Population Circle:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most compact 
Ehrenburg:  Between 0 and 1, 1 most 
compact 
 
Name 
Respect 
county/ 
city 
boundary 
MM 
seat Min Max Mean St. Dev Min Max Mean St. Dev 
 
No treatment plans   -0.01 -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01  
Respect city & county 
boundaries plans X  -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01  
Maximize majority-
minority seats plans  X 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.00  
Respect CC & Max. 
MM plans X X -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.01  
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APPENDIX 3: Nested Seats by Party 1992-2000 
 
 
Table 3a: 1992 Nested Seats by Party 
Thirty Nested Districts With Same Party Seats - 1992 Ten Nested Districts With Split Party Seats - 1992
            
Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party 
            
1992 1 2 1 Dan Hauser D 1992 1 1 3 Bernie Richter D 
   7 Valerie Brown D    4 David Knowles R 
 2 3 6 Vivien Bronshvag D  2 4 2 Stan Statham R 
   13 Willie L. Brown Jr. D    8 Thomas M. Hannigan D 
 3 5 10 Larry Bowler R  3 6 5 B. T. Collins R 
   17 Dean Andal R    9 Phillip Isenberg D 
 4 8 12 John L. Burton D  4 7 11 Bob Campbell D 
   19 Jackie Speier D    15 Richard K. Rainey R 
 5 9 14 Tom Bates D  5 11 21 Byron D. Sher D 
   16 Barbara Lee D    24 Chuck Quackenbush R 
 6 10 18 Jonah Klehs D  6 14 29 Bill Jones D 
   20 Delain Eastin D    32 Trice Harvey R 
 7 12 25 Margaret E. Snyder D  7 18 33 Andrea Seastrand R 
   26 Sal Cannella D    35 Jack O'Connell D 
 8 13 22 John Vasconcellos D  8 32 61 Fred Aguilar R 
   23 Dominic L. Cortese D    62 Joe Baca D 
 9 15 27 Sam Farr D  9 34 68 Curt Pringle R 
   28 Rusty Areias D    69 Tom Umberg D 
 10 16 30 Jim Costa D  10 37 75 Jan Goldsmith R 
   31 Bruce Broznan D    89 Julie Bernstein D 
 11 17 34 Kathleen M. Honeycutt R       
   36 William J. Knight R       
 12 19 37 Nao Takasugi R       
   38 Paula L. Bowland R       
 13 20 39 Richard Katz D       
   40 Barbara Friedman D       
 14 21 43 Pat Nolan R       
   44 Bill Hodge R       
 15 22 45 Richard G. Polanco D       
   46 Louis Caldera D       
 16 23 41 Terry B. Friedman D       
   42 Burt Margolis D       
 17 24 49 Diane Martinez D       
   57 Hilda L. Solis D       
 18 25 51 Curtis R. Tucker Jr. D       
   52 Willard H. Murray Jr. D       
 19 26 47 Gwen Moore D       
   48 Marguerite Archie-Hudson D       
 20 27 54 Betty Karnette D       
   56 Bob Elpe D       
 25
 21 28 53 Debra Bowen D       
   55 Juanita M. McDonald D       
 22 29 59 Richard Mountjoy R       
   60 Paul V. Horcher R       
 23 30 50 Martha M. Escutia D       
   58 Grace Musquiz Napolitano D       
 24 31 63 Jim Bruelte R       
   65 Paul L. Woodruff R       
 25 33 71 Mickey Conroy R       
   72 Ross Johnson R       
 26 35 67 Dorris Allen R       
   70 Gil Ferguson R       
 27 36 64 Ted Weggeland R       
   66 Ray Haynes R       
 28 38 73 Bill Morrow R       
   74 Robert C. Franzee R       
 29 39 76 Mike Gotch D       
   78 Dierdre Alpert D       
 30 40 77 Tom Connolly D       
   79 Steve Peace D       
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Table 3b: 1994 Nested Seats by Party 
Thirty-Two Nested Districts With Same Party Seats - 1994 Eight Nested Districts With Split Party Seats - 1994
            
Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party 
1994 1 1 3 Bernie Richter R 1994 1 4 2 Tom Woods R 
   4 David Knowles R    8 Tom Hannigan D 
 2 2 1 Don Hauser D  2 5 10 Larry Bowler R 
   7 Valerie K. Brown D    17 Michael J. Machado D 
 3 3 6 Kerry Mazzoni D  3 6 5 Barbara Alby R 
   13 Willie L. Brown Jr. D   9 Phillip Isenberg D  
 4 8 12 John L. Burton D  4 7 11 Bob Campbell D 
   19 Jackie Speier D    15 Richard K. Rainey R 
 5 9 14 Tom Bates D  5 11 21 Byron D. Sher D 
   16 Barbara Lee D    24 Jim Cunneen R 
 6 10 18 Michael Sweeney D  6 27 54 Steven T. Knykendall R 
   20 Liz Figueroa D    56 Phil Hawkins D 
 7 12 25 Margaret E. Snyder D  7 32 61 Fred Aguilar R 
   26 Sal Cannella D    62 Joe Baca D 
 8 13 22 John Vasconcellos D  8 40 77 Steve Baldwin R 
   23 Dominic L. Cortese D    79 Denise Moreno Ducheny D 
 9 14 29 Charles S. Poochigian R       
   32 Trice Harvey R       
 10 15 27 Bruce McPhearson R       
   28 Peter Frusetta R       
 11 16 30 Brian Setenchich D       
   31 Cruz M. Bustamante D       
 12 17 34 Keith Olberg R       
   36 Will J. Knight R       
 13 18 33 Tom J. Bordono Jr. R       
   35 Brooks Firestone R       
 14 19 37 Nao Takasugi R       
   38 Paula L. Boland R       
 15 20 39 Richard Katz D       
   40 Barbara Friedman D       
 16 21 43 James F. Rogan R       
   44 Bill Hoge R       
 17 22 45 Antonio Villaraigosa D       
   46 Louis Caldera D       
 18 23 41 Sheila Kuehl D       
   42 Wally Knox D       
 19 24 49 Diane Martinez D       
   57 Martin Gallegos D       
 20 25 51 Curtis R. Tucker Jr. D       
   52 Willard H. Murray Jr. D       
 21 26 47 Kevin Murray D       
   48 Marguerite Archie-Hudson D       
 22 28 53 Debra Bowen D       
   55 Juanita M. McDonald D       
 23 29 59 Richard Mountjoy R       
 27
   60 Paul Horcher R       
 24 30 50 Martha M. Escutia D       
   58 Grace F. Napolitano D       
 25 31 63 Jim Brulte R       
   65 Brett Granlund R       
 26 33 71 Mickey Conroy R       
   72 Ross Johnson R       
 27 34 68 Curt Pringle R       
   69 Jim Morrissey R       
 28 35 67 Dorris Allen R       
   70 Marilyn C. Brewer R       
 29 36 64 Ted Weggeland R       
   66 Bruce Thompson R       
 30 37 75 Jan Goldsmith R       
   80 Jim Battin R       
 31 38 73 Bill Morrow R       
   74 Howard Kaloogian R       
 32 39 76 Susan A. Davis D       
   78 Deirdre Alpert D       
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Table 3c: 1996 Nested Seats by Party 
Twenty-eight Nested Districts With Same Party Seats - 1996 Twelve Nested Districts With Split Party Seats - 1996
            
Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party 
1996 1 1 3 Bernie Richter R 1996 1 4 2 Tom Woods R 
   4 Thomas Oller R    8 Helen Thompson D 
 2 2 1 Virginia R. Strom-Martin D  2 5 10 Larry Bowler R 
   7 Valerie K. Brown D    17 Michael Machado D 
 3 3 6 Kerry Mazzoni D  3 6 5 Barbara Alby R 
   13 Carole Midgen D    9 Debrah Ortiz D 
 4 8 12 Kevin Shelley D  4 7 11 Tom Torlakson D 
   19 Lou Papan D    15 Lynne C. Leach R 
 5 9 14 Dion Louis Aroner D  5 11 21 Ted Lampert D 
   16 Don Perata D    24 James F. Cunneen R 
 6 10 18 Michael Sweeney D  6 12 25 George House R 
   20 Liz Figueroa D    26 Dennis A. Cardoza D 
 7 13 22 Elaine White Alquist D  7 15 27 Fred Keeley D 
   23 Mike Honda D    28 Peter Frusetta R 
 8 14 29 Charles S. Poochigan R  8 16 30 Robert M. Prenter Jr. R 
   32 Roy Ashburn R    31 Cruz M. Bustamante D 
 9 17 34 Keith Olberg R  9 27 54 Steven Knykendall R 
   36 George Runner R    56 Sally M. Havice D 
 10 18 33 Tom J. Bordonaro R  10 32 61 Fred Aguilar R 
   35 Brooks Firestone R    62 Joe Baca D 
 11 19 37 Nao Takasugi R  11 33 71 Bill Campbell D 
   38 Tom McClintock R    72 Dick Ackerman R 
 12 20 39 Tony Cardenas D  12 40 77 Steve Baldwin R 
   40 Bob Hertzberg D    79 Dennise M. Ducheny D 
 13 21 43 Scott Wildman D       
   44 Jack Scott D       
 14 22 45 Antonio Villaraigosa D       
   46 Louis Caldera D       
 15 23 41 Sheila James Kuehl D       
   42 Wally Knox D       
 16 24 49 Diane Martinez D       
   57 Martin Gallegos D       
 17 25 51 Edward Vincent D       
   52 Carl Washington D       
 18 26 47 Kevin Murray D       
   48 Roderick White D       
 19 28 53 Debra Bowen D       
   55 Richard E. Floyd D       
 20 29 59 Bob Margett R       
   60 Gary G. Miller R       
 21 30 50 Martha M. Escutia D       
   58 Grace F. Napolitano D       
 22 31 63 Bill Leonard R       
   65 Brett J. Granlund R       
 23 34 68 Curt Pringle R       
 29
   69 Jim Morrissey R       
 24 35 67 Scott Baugh R       
   70 Marilyn C. Brewer R       
 25 36 64 Rod Pacheco R       
   66 Bruce Thompson R       
 26 37 75 Jan Goldsmith R       
   80 Jim Battin R       
 27 38 73 Bill Morrow R       
   74 Howard Kaloogian R       
 28 39 76 Susan A. Davis D       
   78 Howard Wayne D       
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Table 3d: 1998 Nested Tables by Party 
Twenty-Eight Nested Districts With Same Party Seats- 1998 Twelve Nested Districts With Split Party Seats - 1998
            
Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party 
1998 1 1 3 Sam Aanestad R 1998 1 4 2 Richard Dickerson R 
   4 Thomas Oller R    8 Helen Thompson D 
 2 2 1 Virginia R. Strom-Martin D  2 5 10 Anthony Percetti R 
   7 Valerie K. Brown D    17 Michael Machado D 
 3 3 6 Kerry Mazzoni D  3 6 5 Dave Cox R 
   13 Carole Midgen D    9 Darrel Steinberg D 
 4 8 12 Kevin Shelley D  4 7 11 Tom Torlakson D 
   19 Lou Papan D    15 Lynne C. Leach R 
 5 9 14 Dion Louis Aroner D  5 11 21 Ted Lempert D 
   16 Don Perata D    24 James F. Cunneen R 
 6 10 18 Ellen M. Corbett D  6 12 25 George House R 
   20 John Dutra D    26 Dennis A. Cardoza D 
 7 13 22 Elaine White Alquist D  7 15 27 Fred Keeley D 
   23 Mike Honda D    28 Peter Frusetta R 
 8 14 29 Mike Briggs R  8 18 33 Abel Maldanado R 
   32 Ray Ashburn R    35 Hannah-Beth Jackson D 
 9 16 30 Dean Florez D  9 33 71 Bill Campbell D 
   31 Sarah Reyes D    72 Dick Ackerman R 
 10 17 34 Keith Olberg R  10 34 68 Ken Maddox R 
   36 George Runner R    69 Lou Carrea D 
 11 19 37 Tony Strickland R  11 38 73 Patricia C. Bates R 
   38 Tom McClintock R    74 Howard Kaloogian D 
 12 20 39 Tony Cardenas D  12 40 77 Steve Baldwin R 
   40 Bob Hertzberg D    79 Dennise M. Ducheny D 
 13 21 43 Scott Wildman D       
   44 Jack Scott D       
 14 22 45 Antonio Villaraigosa D       
   46 Gil Cedillo D       
 15 23 41 Sheila James Kuehl D       
   42 Wally Knox D       
 16 24 49 Gloria Romero D       
   57 Martin Gallegos D       
 17 25 51 Edward Vincent D       
   52 Carl Washington D       
 18 26 47 Herb Wesson D       
   48 Roderick Wright D       
 19 27 54 Alan Lowenthal D       
   56 Sally M. Havice D       
 20 28 53 George Nakano D       
   55 Richard E. Floyd D       
 21 29 59 Bob Margett R       
   60 Gary G. Miller R       
 22 30 50 Marco Antonio Firebaugh D       
   58 Thomas M. Calderon D       
 23 31 63 Bill Leonard R       
 31
   65 Brett J. Grandlund R       
 24 32 61 Nell Soto D       
   62 John Longville D       
 25 35 67 Scott Baugh R       
   70 Marilyn C. Brewer R       
 26 36 64 Rod Pacheco R       
   66 Bruce Thompson R       
 27 37 75 Charlene Zetel R       
   80 Jim Battin R       
 28 39 76 Susan A. Davis D       
   78 Howard Wayne D       
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Table 3e: 2000 Nested Seats by Party 
Twenty-Eight Nested Districts With Same Party Seats - 2000 Twelve Nested Districts With Split Party Seats - 2000
            
Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party Year Number SD AD Assembly Member Party 
2000 1 1 3 Sam Aanestad R 2000 1 4 2 Richard Dickerson R 
   4 Tim Leslie R    8 Helen Thompson D 
 2 2 1 Virginia R. Strom-Martin D  2 5 10 Anthony Percetti R 
   7 Patricia Wiggins D    17 Barbara Matthews D 
 3 3 6 Joe Nation D  3 6 5 Dave Cox R 
   13 Carole Midgen D    9 Darrel Steinberg D 
 4 8 12 Kevin Shelley D  4 7 11 Joe Canciamilla D 
   19 Lou Papan D    15 Lynne C. Leach R 
 5 9 14 Dion Luis Aroner D  5 12 25 Dave Cogdill R 
   16 Wilma Chan D    26 Dennis A. Cordoza D 
 6 10 18 Ellen M. Corbett D  6 15 27 Fred Keeley D 
   20 John Dutra D    28 Simon Salinas R 
 7 11 21 Joe Simitian D  7 17 34 Robert Conaway D 
   24 Rebecca Cohn D    36 George Runner R 
 8 13 22 Elaine White Alquist D  8 18 33 Abel Maldanado R 
   23 Manny Diaz D    35 Hannah-Beth Jackson D 
 9 14 29 Mike Briggs R  9 33 71 Bill Campbell D 
   32 Roy Ashburn R    72 Lynn Daucher R 
 10 16 30 Dean Florez D  10 34 68 Ken Maddox R 
   31 Sarah Reyes D    69 Lou Correa D 
 11 19 37 Tony Strickland R  11 38 73 Patricia C. Bates R 
   38 Keith Stuart Richman R    74 Mark Wyland D 
 12 20 39 Tony Cardenas D  12 40 77 Jay La Suer R 
   40 Bob Hertzberg D    79 Juan Vargas D 
 13 21 43 Dario J. Frommer D       
   44 Carol Liu D       
 14 22 45 Jackie Goldberg D       
   46 Gil Cedillo D       
 15 23 41 Fran Pavely D       
   42 Paul Koretz D       
 16 24 49 Gloria Romero D       
   57 Edward Chavez D       
 17 25 51 Jerome F. Horton D       
   52 Carl Washington D       
 18 26 47 Herb Wesson D       
   48 Roderick Wright D       
 19 27 54 Alan Lowenthal D       
   56 Sally M. Havice D       
 20 28 53 George Nakano D       
   55 Jenny Oropeza D       
 21 29 59 Dennis Mountjoy R       
   60 Gary G. Miller R       
 22 30 50 Marco Antonio Firebaugh D       
   58 Thomas M. Calderon D       
 23 31 63 Bill Leonard R       
 33
 34
   65 Jan Leja R       
 24 32 61 Gloria Negrete McLeod D       
   62 John Longville D       
 25 35 67 Tom Harman R       
   70 John Campbell R       
 26 36 64 Rod Pacheco R       
   66 Dennis Hollingsworth R       
 27 37 75 Charlene Zettel R       
   80 Dave Kelley R       
 28 39 76 Christine Kehoe D       
   78 Howard Wayne D       
APPENDIX 4: Interview Summary Chart 
 
 
 Respondent A Respondent B Respondent C Respondent D Respondent E Respondent F Respondent G Respondent H 
Question 1: Did the nesting 
arrangement facilitate or 
undermine the relationship 
with the member of the other 
nested Assembly district in 
your Senate seat? 
Depends on the 
other member Undermined       Facilitated Facilitated Undermined Facilitated Both Neither
Question 2: Did the 
relationship with the other 
nested seat change over time 
as the prospect of the senate 
seat opening became more 
imminent? 
No [Never 
wanted to be a 
Senator] 
Yes       Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Question 3: What are some 
examples of successful 
cooperation on legislation 
with the other nested seat 
member? 
Senate Bill X, 
environmental 
projects, 
infrastructure 
[N/A] Washington Hospital issue 
Building a high 
school 
After agreement 
not run for same 
seat, both 
supported each 
other's efforts 
Cremation 
company issue 
District business, 
working with 
interest groups 
Bond money, 
parks 
Question 4: What are some 
examples of unsuccessful 
efforts at cooperation on 
legislation with the other 
nested seat member? 
Drawing lines, 
immigration [N/A] 
Budget deficit, 
partner was greedy 
All had to do with 
party 
unsuccessful effort 
= they ran against 
each other 
Any time the other 
member would 
grandstand on an 
issue 
District business, 
working with 
interest groups 
[N/A] 
5. Did you mail into the other 
district?  If so, when and 
about what? 
Yes, about non-
partisan issues No 
Yes, respondent 
was helping 
represent them 
No 
Yes, campaign 
mail during active 
campaign 
No Yes, interest groups No, not allowed to 
Question 6: Did you do 
appearances in the other 
districts?  If so, what sort? 
Yes, educational 
/environmental 
issues 
Yes, ceremonial 
and personal 
Yes, where 
respondent knew 
people 
Yes, when invited Yes, because it's normal 
Yes, for party 
purposes Yes, when invited 
Yes, state 
education budget 
Question 7: Do you favor 
making nesting a requirement 
for future redistricting? 
Why/why not? 
Not for or against 
it, there are too 
many micro 
variables 
No, there is too 
much bias No, no need 
Yes, it provides 
clarity and integrity 
for the constituents 
No, redist. not as 
equitable as it 
could be 
Yes, the lines are 
clear and you 
know who your 
rep. is 
Yes, because you'll 
know who your 
rep. is 
No, not as number 
one requirement. 
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